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Details about  An Introduction to the Structural Econometrics of Auction Data, Harry J Paarsch,

An Introduction to the Structural Econometrics of Auction Data, Harry J Paarsch,

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Publisher: MIT Press Ltd
ISBN-13: 9780262162357 ISBN-10: 0262162350
ISBN: 9780262162357

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Description
This text, intended for both graduate students and professional researchers, is an effective, concise introduction to the structural ecometrics of auctions. Tools from recent developments in theoretical ecometrics are combined with established numerical methods to provide a practical guide to most of the main concepts in the empirical analysis of field data from auctions. Among other things, the text is remarkable for a large number of mathematical problems and computer exercises for which sample solutions are provided at the end of the book. In the case of the computer exercises, sample code written in Matlab provides a ready-made toolbox that allows readers to implement many existing empirical specifications efficiently.In the first two chapters, the authors introduce several important issues in the analysis of field data from auctions and then go on to develop a simple theoretical model within the independent, private-values paradigm. In the third chapter, under several data-generating schemes, the authors outline empirical methods for analyzing data from single-unit Vickrey and English auctions, while in the fourth chapter, they outline methods for analyzing data from single-unit, Dutch, and first-price sealed-bid auctions. In the fifth chapter, the authors discuss theoretical issues important in the analysis of multi-good auctions, focusing on the analysis of multi-unit auctions, and then provide examples of some recent strategies designed to analyze data from these auctions. Included at the end are a number of appendixes that review the technical tools required in developing the topics treated in the text. A CD-ROM containing sample computer code and data sets accompanies the text.

Key Features
Author(s)Han Hong, Harry J. Paarsch
PublisherMIT Press Ltd
Date of Publication03/02/2006
LanguageEnglish
FormatHardback
ISBN-100262162350
ISBN-139780262162357
SubjectIndustrial Studies: General

Publication Data
Place of PublicationCambridge, Mass.
Country of PublicationUnited States
ImprintMIT Press
Content NoteIllustrations

Dimensions
Weight885 g
Width178 mm
Height229 mm
Spine25 mm

Age Details
Interest AgeFrom 18

Description
Author BiographyHarry J. Paarsch is Professor of Economics and Robert Jensen Research Fellow at the Henry B. Tippie College of Business, University of Iowa. Han Hong is Associate Professor of Economics at Duke University. M. Ryan Haley is Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh.

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An Introduction to the Structural Econometrics of Auction Data
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Author:Harry J Paarsch
ISBN/EAN:9780262162357
Publisher:MIT Press
Publication Date:2006-02-03
Binding:HRD
Pages:509
Language: This book should contain text in eng
Our Ref:WM-9780262162357
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