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About this product
- DescriptionCoalition Formation and Social Choice provides a unified and comprehensive study of coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. It discusses the main existing theories including the size principle, conflict of interest theory, dominant player theory, policy distance theory and power excess theory. In addition, the book offers new theories of coalition formation in which the endogeus formation of preferences for coalitions is basic. Both simple game theory and social choice theory are extensively applied in the treatment of the theories. This combined application t only leads to new theories but also offers a new and fresh perspective on coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. The book covers the fundamental concepts and results of social choice theory including Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Furthermore, it gives a coherent treatment of the theory of simple games. Besides more traditional topics in simple game theory like power indices, it also introduces new aspects of simple games such as the Chow parameter, the Chow vector and the tion of similar games.
- Author(s)Ad M.A.Van Deemen,Adrian M. A. van Deemen
- PublisherSpringer-Verlag New York Inc.
- Date of Publication03/12/2010
- SubjectEconomics: Professional & General
- Series TitleTheory and Decision Library C
- Series Part/Volume Number19
- Place of PublicationNew York, NY
- Country of PublicationUnited States
- ImprintSpringer-Verlag New York Inc.
- Content Note1 black & white illustrations, biography
- Weight364 g
- Width156 mm
- Height234 mm
- Spine13 mm
- Format DetailsTrade paperback (US)
- Edition Statement1st ed. Softcover of orig. ed. 1997
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