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About this product
- DescriptionThere is a broad sense in both Russia and the United States that deep nuclear reductions-a goal endorsed by both governments-would constitute a risky step into the unkwn and could undermine international security. However, until w, the reasons behind these concerns-and whether they are justified-have t been properly explored. Based on a series of interviews with opinion formers in both Russia and the United States, this Adelphi maps out these concerns as they relate to the effectiveness of deterrence (including extended deterrence), the possible incentives to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis, the potential for rearmament and nuclear multipolarity. Contrary to popular belief, there is evidence against which these fears can be assessed. The practical experience of deterrence at low numbers that was acquired by the Soviet Union and the United States early in the Cold War, as well as by other nuclear-armed states, is highly relevant. Based on this experience and insights from deterrence theory, this Adelphi concludes that most of the challenges associated with low numbers are t really a consequence of arsenal size and, accordingly, that there are good reasons to believe that deep reductions would t undermine international security.
- Author(s)James M. Acton
- PublisherTaylor & Francis Ltd
- Date of Publication18/03/2011
- Place of PublicationLondon
- Country of PublicationUnited Kingdom
- Content NoteIllustrations
- Weight249 g
- Width156 mm
- Height234 mm
- Spine5 mm
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