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- DescriptionPractical Reality is about the relation between the reason why we do things and the reasons why we should. It maintains that current philosophical orthodoxy bowdlerizes this relation, making it impossible to understand how anyone can act for a good reason. In order to understand this, Dancy claims, we have to abandon current conceptions of the reasons why we act (our 'motivating' reasons) as mental states of ourselves. Belief/desire explanations of action, or purely cognitive accounts in terms of beliefs alone, drive too great a wedge between the rmative and the motivational. Instead, we have to understand a motivating reason as the sort of thing that could be a good reason: for instance, that the eggs are ready - this, rather than my believing that they are ready, must be my reason for taking them off the cooker. Most contemporary philosophers think that this view cant be true. Dancy aims to demonstrate that things can be as he thinks they must be. By giving a fresh account of values and reasons, he finds a place for rmativity in philosophy of mind and action, and strengthens the connection between these areas and ethics.
- Author BiographyJonathan Dancy is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Reading.
- Author(s)Jonathan Dancy
- PublisherOxford University Press
- Date of Publication01/08/2002
- Place of PublicationOxford
- Country of PublicationUnited Kingdom
- ImprintOxford University Press
- Content Notebibliography, index
- Weight264 g
- Width138 mm
- Height215 mm
- Spine11 mm
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