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About this product
- DescriptionDavid Henderson and Terence Horgan set out a broad new approach to epistemology, which they see as a mixed discipline, having both a priori and empirical elements. They defend the roles of a priori reflection and conceptual analysis in philosophy, but their revisionary account of these philosophical methods allows them a subtle but essential empirical dimension. They espouse a dual-perspective position which they call iceberg epistemology, respecting the important differences between epistemic processes that are consciously accessible and those that are t. Reflecting on epistemic justification, they introduce the tion of transglobal reliability as the mark of the cognitive processes that are suitable for humans. Which cognitive processes these are depends on contingent facts about human cognitive capacities, and these cant be kwn a priori.
- Author BiographyDavid Henderson is Robert R. Chambers Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and the Moral Sciences at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. He is the author of Interpretation and Explanation in the Human Sciences and a number of articles on epistemology and the philosophy of the social sciences. Terry Horgan is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. His research interests are metaphysics, epistemology, mind, and metaethics, and he has published widely across these disciplines.
- Author(s)David K. Henderson,Terence Horgan
- PublisherOxford University Press
- Date of Publication04/08/2011
- SubjectPsychology: Textbooks & Study Guides
- Place of PublicationOxford
- Country of PublicationUnited Kingdom
- ImprintOxford University Press
- Weight608 g
- Width172 mm
- Height240 mm
- Spine25 mm
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