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About this product
- DescriptionIssues concerning the unity of minds, bodies and the world have often recurred in the history of philosophy and, more recently, in scientific models. Taking into account both the philosophical and scientific kwledge about consciousness, this book presents and discusses some theoretical guiding ideas for the science of consciousness. The authors argue that, within this interdisciplinary context, a consensus appears to be emerging assuming that the conscious mind and the functioning brain are two aspects of a complex system that interacts with the world. How can this concept of reality - one that includes the existence of consciousness - be approached both philosophically and scientifically? The Unity of Mind, Brain and World is the result of a three-year online discussion between the authors who present a diversity of perspectives, tending towards a theoretical synthesis, aimed to contribute to the insertion of this field of kwledge in the academic curriculum.
- Author BiographyAlfredo Pereira, Jr is Adjunct Professor in the Department of Education at the Institute of Biosciences, Sao Paulo State University (UNESP). Dietrich Lehmann is Professor Emeritus of Clinical Neurophysiology at the University of Zurich and a member of the KEY Institute for Brain-Mind Research at the University Hospital of Psychiatry, Zurich.
- PublisherCambridge University Press
- Date of Publication12/09/2013
- SubjectPsychology: Textbooks & Study Guides
- Place of PublicationCambridge
- Country of PublicationUnited Kingdom
- ImprintCambridge University Press
- Content Note39 b/w illus. 6 tables
- Weight650 g
- Width152 mm
- Height228 mm
- Spine24 mm
- Edited byAlfredo Pereira,Dietrich Lehmann
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