What kind of properties are moral qualities, such as rightness, badness, etc? Some ethicists doubt that there are any such properties; they maintain that thinking that something is morally wrong (for example) is comparable to thinking that something is a unicorn or a ghost. These moral error theorists argue that the world simply does t contain the kind of properties or objects necessary to render our moral judgments true. This radical form of moral skepticism was championed by the philosopher John Mackie (1917-1981). This anthology is a collection of philosophical essays critically examining Mackie's view.
Richard Joyce is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney. He received his PhD from Princeton University in 1998, after which he was a lecturer at the University of Sheffield. He is the author of The Myth of Morality (Cambridge University Press, 2001) and The Evolution of Morality (MIT Press, 2006). Simon Kirchn is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Kent. He received his PhD from the University of Sheffield and subsequently taught at the University of Bristol. He is the author of a number of papers in metaethics and the co-editor (with Andrew Fisher) of Arguing About Metaethics (2006). He is currently writing a book on thick concepts. He was elected President of the British Society of Ethical Theory in 2008 and is an Assistant Editor of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.