Examines the almost continual efforts of British and Indian soldiers (both regular and irregular) to combat and pacify the Pashtun tribes of the North-West Frontier. It will also examine the tactics employed in the various campaigns. Chapter 1 deals briefly with the historical background of the British in India, geography of the North-West Frontier, the Pashtun tribes, and a short account of the First Afghan War. Chapter 2 addresses British military operations from 1849-1900 and discusses the Punjab Irregular Force (PIF) and its efforts to stop Pashtun raids into Punjab, as well as early punitive expeditions into the North-West Frontier. The chapter also examines the failure to pass along the lessons of the PIF to the British and Indian regular forces as they deployed for the first time in strength into the North-West Frontier during the Pashtun revolt of 1897. The chapter additionally investigates the renewed tactical effectiveness of the Pashtun tribes, brought about by modern and more effective weapons. Chapter 3 will explore British attempts to capture the lessons of the 1897-1898 Pashtun revolt by publishing new training manuals, instituting new training programs, and folding the irregular forces into the British and Indian Regular Army. The chapter will examine the success of these programs (the 1908 Khel and Mohmand campaigns), and the dire consequences of their abandonment prior to the 1919-1921 Waziristan Campaign. Chapter 4 will examine the challenges confronting the British and Indian Army on the North-West Frontier during the 1920s and 1930s. The chapter will discuss British attempts to Pass It On or incorporate the past lessons of hill warfare. The results of these new tactical adjustments will be explored by examining the 1935 Mohmand campaign, the 1936-1937 Waziristan campaign, and British efforts to track down and kill the elusive Faqir of Ipi. The final chapter will offer an analysis of lessons learned by the British on the North-West Frontier and their relevance for the US Army and its allies.