Contesting much contemporary epistemology and cognitive science, ted philosopher Kenneth M. Sayre argues that, while some cognitive attitudes such as believing take propositions as objects, there are many others (kwing, hoping, fearing, etc.) whose objects are instead states of affairs. Therefore, kwledge cant be belief with other factors such as justification added, r can hope and fear be relations a subject bears to neuronal brain states functioning as propositional representations. To support these claims Sayre undertakes a detailed exploration of belief and kwledge and traces the relations of cognitive attitudes to a network of related concepts like certainty, truth, representation, and intentionality. His findings t only challenge current orthodoxy but open new paths of research in epistemology and cognitive science.
Kenneth M. Sayre is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame and the author of fifteen previous books on subjects ranging from artificial intelligence to Platonic dialogues.