Can every allocation in the core of an ecomy be decentralized by a suitably chosen price system? Werner Hildenbrand shows that the answer is yes if the ecomy has many participating agents and if the influence of every individual agent on collective actions is negligible. To give a general and precise definition of ecomics with this property he considers both ecomies with a continuum of agents, and a sequence of ecomies with an increasing number of participants. In both cases this leads to a measure theoretic formulation of ecomic equilibrium analysis. In the first part of the book the relevant mathematics is developed. In the second part the continuity and convexity properties of the total demand of a consumption sector are investigated. An important result is the equivalence between the core and the set of Walras equilibria for an exchange ecomy with a continuum of agents. The author then deals with limit theorems on the core for purely competitive sequences of exchange ecomies. In the last chapter the core and the set of Walras equilibria for a coalition production ecomy and the relation between these two equilibrium concepts are studied. Originally published in 1974. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand techlogy to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.