Contemporary developments in philosophy have declared truth as such troublesome, and t merely gaining access to it. In a systematic survey this study investigates what is at stake when truth is given up. A historical overview shows how the current problem of truth came about, and suggests ways to overcome rather than to repair the problem. A key issue resulting from the loss of truth is the lack of rmativity. Truth provided an alternative understanding of rmativity. Elaborating on the 'dialectical shift' in logic, a dialogico-rhetorical understanding of rmativity is presented. Rather than requiring truth, agreement, or rationality, dialogico-rhetorical rmativity is the result of a balance of particular standards. This type of rmativity is shaped within discussions - by advancing and accepting arguments - and is t located in sets of predetermined rules. The result is a 'small' but strong form of rmativity. If this understanding of rmativity is viable, one of the central problems of contemporary philosophy, the problem of incommensurability, can be seen in a different light. As a result, truth reappears again. Surviving the postmodern criticisms, it is a matter of accountability rather than of description.