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About this product
- DescriptionThe concept of luck has played an important role in debates concerning free will and moral responsibility, yet participants in these debates have relied upon an intuitive tion of what luck is. Neil Levy develops an account of luck, which is then applied to the free will debate. He argues that the standard luck objection succeeds against common accounts of libertarian free will, but that it is possible to amend libertarian accounts so that they are more vulnerable to luck than is compatibilism. But compatibilist accounts of luck are themselves vulnerable to a powerful luck objection: historical compatibilisms cant satisfactorily explain how agents can take responsibility for their constitutive luck; n-historical compatibilisms run into insurmountable difficulties with the epistemic condition on control over action. Levy argues that because epistemic conditions on control are so demanding that they are rarely satisfied, agents are t blameworthy for performing actions that they take to be best in a given situation. It follows that if there are any actions for which agents are responsible, they are akratic actions; but even these are unacceptably subject to luck. Levy goes on to discuss recent n-historical compatibilisms, and argues that they do t offer a viable alternative to control-based compatibilisms. He suggests that luck undermines our freedom and moral responsibility matter whether determinism is true or t.
- Author BiographyNeil Levy is Head of Neuroethics at the Florey Neuroscience Institutes and Director of Research at the Oxford Centre for Neuroethics. He is the author of five previous books and many articles, on a wide range of topics including applied ethics, free will and moral responsibility, philosophical psychology, and philosophy of mind. He divides his time between Melbourne, Australia, and Oxford, England.
- Author(s)Neil Levy
- PublisherOxford University Press
- Date of Publication27/11/2014
- Place of PublicationOxford
- Country of PublicationUnited Kingdom
- ImprintOxford University Press
- Content Noteblack & white illustrations
- Weight294 g
- Width141 mm
- Height215 mm
- Spine12 mm
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