Kwledge in an Uncertain World is an exploration of the relation between kwledge, reasons, and justification. According to the primary argument of the book, you can rely on what you kw in action and belief, because what you kw can be a reason you have and you can rely on the reasons you have. If kwledge doesn't allow for a chance of error, then this result is unsurprising. But if kwledge does allow for a chance of error - as seems required if we kw much of anything at all - this result entails the denial of a received position in epistemology. Because any chance of error, if the stakes are high eugh, can make a difference to what can be relied on, two subjects with the same evidence and generally the same strength of epistemic position for a proposition can differ with respect to whether they are in a position to kw. In defending these points, Fantl and McGrath investigate the ramifications for debates about epistemological externalism and contextualism, the value and importance of kwledge, Wittgensteinian hinge propositions, Bayesianism, and the nature of belief. The book is essential reading for epistemologists, philosophers who work on reasons and rationality, philosophers of language and mind, and decision theorists.
Matthew McGrath received his Ph.D. from Brown University in 1998 and is currently Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department at the University of Missouri.