This is a theoretical, historical, and doctrinal analysis of current deception planning procedures in accordance with FM 90-2, Battlefield Deception Operations. Initially, there is a discussion of military theorist's opinions as to the importance of surprise and deception at the operational level of war. Then there is an analysis of the historical use of surprise gained through deception efforts and the utility of METT-T as a deception planning tool at the operational level. The paper demonstrated the dialectic quality of METT-T as well as concluded that the use of METT-T from both a friendly and enemy perspective is an imperative in the development of an operational level deception plan. The paper also concluded that a doctrinal void does exist in the Preliminary Draft of FM 90-2 in regards to the deception planning process. This void is extremely significant in that a process that merely considered the deception operation from a friendly perspective would only fulfill half of the requirement for a comprehensive METT-T analysis.