Religious freedom is wadays regarded as one of the rmal demands of our fundamental rights. In the state system it is clected by the ruler, who tolerates a variety of religious deminations and the association of the faithful for the purpose of joint religious worship and ceremony. On these lines tolerance has been in existence only since the 17th century. For the mir state of antiquity both citizenship and religious community are identical. Because the welfare of the state is dependent upon the favour of the deity or deities, the state community owes hirn or them its veneration. The individual citizen who excludes hirns elf from this threat ens the foundations of the state and is banished; if he does t submit to this, he must forfeit his life (Socrates). If groups of dissidents are formed, then they must all leave the country (expulsiuns Irum Rome). vVhen, after Alexander the Great, empires embracing various peoples are formed and banishment of the dissenters is longer practicable, religious philosophy offers the state the possibility of tolerance. It differentiates to the extent of a threefold manner of referring to the deity and, accordingly, of worshipping hirn. The mythical theology of the simple folk needs t to cause the statesman any concern as long as state-threatening con spiracies develop from this. The cult-hostile philosophic theology of a small elite hardly distresses anybody anyhow.
Bernhard Keotting, Bernhard Kotting
Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden
Paperback / softback
Education & Teaching
Rheinisch-Westfalische Akademie Der Wissenschaften