The problem of philosophical scepticism is t so much what to say about the view itself (there being a consensus that it should be rejected), but rather what to say about the arguments that purport to yield it. And since these arguments involve claims and principles concerning tions like kwledge and possibility, it is difficult to see how to explore the arguments without exploring these tions too. -from the IntroductionHow do we address philosophical arguments whose conclusions contradict our commonsense kwledge? For example: a logically impeccable argument that concludes that you cant kw that you are at this very moment reading a description of a book of philosophy. That is the problem of philosophical scepticism. Scepticism, Kwledge, and Forms of Reasoning is an attempt to resolve how best to respond to such vexing arguments, a matter on which there is consensus among contemporary philosophers. Rather than denying the premises of such arguments or simply declaring them invalid, John Koethe delves into what such arguments reveal about the nature of reasoning itself. He suggests that there is thing straightforwardly wrong with sceptical arguments, and that in recognizing this while at the same time horing our commonsense convictions about kwledge, we confront profound questions about the very nature of reasoning.
John Koethe is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee. He was a Fellow at the American Academy in Berlin for Spring 2005. His many books include The Continuity of Wittgenstein's Thought, also from Cornell, Poetry at One Remove: Essays, North Point North: New and Selected Poems, Falling Water, and the forthcoming Sally's Hair.