In this book I address a dichotomy that is as central as any in ontology - that between ordinary objects or substances and the various attributes (Le. , properties, kinds, and relations) we associate with them. My aim is to arrive at the correct philosophical account of each member of the dichotomy. What I shall argue is that the various attempts to understand substances or attri- butes in reductive terms fail. Talk about attributes, I shall try to show, is just that - talk about attributes; and, likewise, talk about substances is just tha- talk about substances. The result is what many will find a strange combina- tion of views - a Platonistic theory of attributes, where attributes are univer- sals or multiply exemplifiable entities whose existence is independent of the world of flux , and an Aristotelian theory of substance, where substances are basic unities t reducible to metaphysically more fundamental kinds of things. Part One is concerned with the ontology of attributes. After distinguishing three different patterns of metaphysical thinking about attributes, I examine, in turn, the phemena of predication, resemblance, and higher order quanti- fication. I argue that ne of these phemena by itself is sufficient to establish the inescapability of a Platonistic interpretation of attributes. Then, I discuss the phemen of abstract reference as it is exhibited in the use of abstract singular terms.