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About this product
- DescriptionThis book considers some issues common to the philosophical systems of Kant and Husserl. The distinction between Kant's Synthesis and Husserl's Intentionality is the main subject of this book. The theme of the analysis is the variation of the position and essence of the term Intuition - Anschauung in the two systems. In both systems, Intuition has a central significance. In Kant's system it is because of his conception that the structure of kwledge is a synthesis of intuition and reason. In Husserl's system this is because he considered Intuition to be the medium for the discernment of data. Given the structured nature of philosophical systems, these topics cant be isolated from the systems in which they function, relating them in each case with various paths of investigation and different interpretations of phemelogy.
- Author BiographyNathan Rotenstreich, 1914-1993, was Professor of Philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He was the Rector of this University and the Vice President of the Israel Academy of Science and Humanities. Some of his well known essays are: Between Past and Present, Spirit and Man, Tradition and Reality, and Jewish Philosophy in Modern Times. Together with S.H. Bergman he translated Kant's three Critiques into Hebrew.
- Author(s)Nathan Rotenstreich
- Date of Publication07/12/2010
- Series TitleContributions to Phenomenology
- Series Part/Volume Number33
- Place of PublicationDordrecht
- Country of PublicationNetherlands
- Content Note2 black & white illustrations, biography
- Weight237 g
- Width155 mm
- Height235 mm
- Spine8 mm
- Format DetailsTrade paperback (US)
- Edition Statement1st ed. Softcover of orig. ed. 1998
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