There is a growing interest in delegation to n-majoritarian institutions in Europe, following both the spread of principal-agent theory in political science and law and increasing delegation in practice. During the 1980s and 1990s, governments and parliaments in West European nations have delegated powers and functions to n-majoritarian bodies - the EU, independent central banks, constitutional courts and independent regulatory agencies. Whereas elected policy makers had been increasing their roles over several decades, delegation involves a remarkable reversal or at least transformation of their position. This volume examines key issues about the politics of delegation: how and why delegation has taken place; the institutional design of delegation to n-majoritarian institutions; the consequences of delegation to n-majoritarian institutions; the legitimacy of n-majoritarian institutions. The book addresses these questions both theoretically and empirically, looking at central areas of political life - central banking, the EU, the increasing role of courts and the establishment and impacts of independent regulatory agencies.