More than any other episode since the end of the Cold War, the conflict in Kosovo revealed the distinctive attributes of a new American way of war. In so doing, Kosovo also brought into sharp focus the military, political, and moral dilemmas confronting a liberal democracy intent on wielding preeminent power on a global scale. What are the moral implications posed by waging high-tech warfare for humanitarian purposes? Does the precedent set by intervention of this type point toward peace and stability or toward more war? How well suited are the United States military and American society as a whole to the security challenges of the age of globalization? According to Bacevich and Cohen, gauging the success achieved in Kosovo yields important answers to these and related questions. The volume includes a well-crafted historical overview of the war and six essays that place it in a broader context. The contributors explore the conflict's relationship to U.S. grand strategy, the Revolution in Military Affairs, and American civil-military relations, among other topics. Contributors: William A. Arkin, Andrew J. Bacevich, Eliot A. Cohen, Alberto R.Coll, James Kurth, Anatol Lieven, Michael Vickers
Andrew J. Bacevich is professor of international relations at Boston University where he also serves as director of the university's Center for International Relations. He is the author of The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam. He lives in Walpole, Massachusetts. Eliot Cohen is professor of strategic studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, where he is also the founding director of the Center for Strategic Education. He is the coauthor of Revolution in Warfare?: Air Power in the Persian Gulf. He lives in Silver Spring, Maryland.