The book investigates a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. The experimental design allows investigation of how subjects solve the bargaining problem. A prominence level analysis is applied to the data and suggests that subjects tend to choose round numbers. It is shown that there exists a correlation between machiavellianism and subjects' adjustment behaviour in the game. The learning behaviour is discussed extensively. Plaintiffs' acceptance limits polarize at the beginning of the second play. A model of learning direction theory applied to explain subjects's behaviour over the course of the game.
Product Identifiers
Publisher
Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg Gmbh & Co. Kg
ISBN-13
9783540613046
eBay Product ID (ePID)
95639949
Product Key Features
Author
Wolfgang Ryll
Publication Name
Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information: an Experimental Study
Format
Paperback
Language
English
Subject
Economics
Publication Year
1996
Type
Textbook
Number of Pages
176 Pages
Dimensions
Item Height
233mm
Item Width
155mm
Volume
440
Item Weight
610g
Additional Product Features
Title_Author
Wolfgang Ryll
Series Title
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems