Table of Content
, Acknowledgements, IntroductionPART 1. WHAT ARE MENTAL STATES?1. Dualism1.1 Substance dualism1.2 Arguments in favor of substance dualism1.3 Arguments against substance dualism1.4 Property dualism1.5 Assessing epiphenomenalism1.6 Conclusion2. Behaviorism2.1 Philosophical behaviorism2.2 Arguments in favor of philosophical behaviorism2.3 Arguments against philosophical behaviorism2.4 What is methodological behaviorism?2.5 Arguments for methodological behaviorism2.6 Arguments against methodological behaviorism3. The identity theory3.1 More about the identity theory3.2 Arguments in favor of the identity theory3.3 Evidence from deficit studies3.4 Arguments against the identity theory3.5 Reductive and nonreductive physicalism3.6 Conclusion4. Functionalism4.1 Introducing functionalism4.2 Functionalism and brain states4.3 Functionalism and the six features of mental states4.4 Two famous arguments against functionalism4.5 Conclusion5. Eliminativism and fictionalism5.1 From theory to reality5.2 Introducing eliminativism5.3 Eliminativism about mental states5.4 Anti-eliminativist arguments5.5 Fictionalism5.6 ConclusionPART 2. MIND AS MACHINE6. The computational theory of mind6.1 Syntax and semantics6.2 What's a computer?6.3 Turing machines6.4 The computational theory of mind6.5 The language of thought6.6 The Chinese room6.7 Conclusion7. Connectionism7.1 What connectionist networks are like7.2 Some important properties of connectionist networks7.3 Connectionism and the mind7.4 Rationality, language, systematicity7.5 ConclusionPART 3. MIND IN A PHYSICAL WORLD8. Physicalism and supervenience8.1 Physical properties8.2 Introducing the supervenience approach to physicalism8.3 Refining the supervenience approach to physicalism8.4 A problem for the supervenience approach to physicalism?9. Content9.1 The resemblance theory9.2 The causal theory9.3 The teleological theory9.4 Fodor's theory9.5 Functional role theory9.6 Wide or narrow?10. Mental causation10.1 The problem of causal exclusion10.2 Responding to the problem of causal exclusion10.3 The causal efficacy of content10.4 Responding to the problem of the causal efficacy of contentPART 4. CONSCIOUSNESS11. Varieties of consciousness11.1 Phenomenal consciousness11.2 Access consciousness11.3 Is access a function of phenomenal consciousness?11.4 Avoiding confusion11.5 Other kinds of consciousness12. Phenomenal consciousness12.1 The knowledge argument12.2 Responding to the knowledge argument12.3 The explanatory gap12.4 Can the explanatory gap be filled?12.5 Functionalism and phenomenal consciousness12.6 Concluding remarks, Appendix: Paper writing tips, Glossary, Some useful resources, References, Index
