Table Of ContentList of Maps and Illustrations Preface List of Abbreviations Introduction One. Red Army Forces -Size and Configuration -Actual Force Generation and Mobilization -Statistical Data Two. Command and Control and Command Personnel -The Continuing Purges -Command Cadre and Training -Key Command and Staff Personnel -Statistical Data Three. The Soviet Soldier -Stereotypes -Sources -The Evolving Official Image -The Emerging Human Dimension Four. Strategic Deployment Planning and Mobilization -War and Strategic Deployment Planning on the Eve of War -Mobilization Planning -Mobilization and Strategic Deployment Prior to 22 June 1941 -Statistical Data Five. Combat Readiness: Ground Combat Forces -Ground Forces -Rifle Forces -Mechanized Forces -Cavalry -Airborne Forces (Air Assault) -Fortified Regions -Statistical Data Six. Combat Readiness: Combat Support and Rear Service Forces -Artillery -Engineers -Signal Forces -Air Defense -Border Guards and NKVD Forces -Rear Services -Statistical Data Seven. Air Forces -Structure, Equipment, and Command and Control -Personnel and Unit Training and Tactics -Readiness for War -Readiness in Practice -Statistical Data Eight. Stavka and Strategic Reserves -Initial Reserves (June to 15 July 1941) -Subsequent Reserves (15 July to August 1941) -Mechanized Reserves -Support Forces -Statistical Data Nine. Red Army Intelligence on the Eve of War -Warning of War -On the Eve of Barbarossa -Judgments on Soviet Intelligence in June 1941 Conclusions Appendix A. Red Army Order of Battle, 22 June to 1 August 1941 Appendix B. Red Army 1941 Defense Plans Appendix C. An Opponent's View: German Intelligence Assessments Appendix D. Correlation of Forces on the German-Soviet Front Notes Bibliographical Essay and Selective Bibliography Index
SynopsisGermany's surprise attack on June 22, 1941, shocked a Soviet Union woefully unprepared to defend itself. The day before the attack, the Red Army still comprised the world's largest fighting force. But by the end of the year, four and a half million of its soldiers lay dead. This new study, based on formerly classified Soviet archival material and neglected German sources, reveals the truth behind this national catastrophe. Drawing on evidence never before seen in the West-including combat records of early engagements-David Glantz claims that in 1941 the Red Army was poorly trained, inadequately equipped, ineptly organized, and consequently incapable of engaging in large-scale military campaigns-and that both Hitler and Stalin knew it. He provides the most complete and convincing study of why the Soviets almost lost the war that summer, dispelling many of the myths about the Red Army that have persisted since the war and soundly refuting Viktor Suvorov's controversial thesis that Stalin was planning a preemptive strike against Germany. Stumbling Colossus describes the Red Army's command leadership, mobilization and war planning, intelligence activities, and active and reserve combat formations. It includes the first complete Order of Battle of Soviet forces on the eve of the German attack, documents the strength of Soviet armored forces during the war's initial period, and reproduces the first available texts of actual Soviet war plans. It also provides biographical sketches of Soviet officers and tells how Stalin's purges of the late 1930s left the Red Army leadership almost decimated. At a time when blame for the war in eastern Europe is being laid with a fallen regime, Glantz's book sets the record straight on the Soviet Union's readiness-and willingness-to fight. Boasting an extensive bibliography of Soviet and German sources, Stumbling Colossus is a convincing study that overshadows recent revisionist history and one that no student of World War II can ignore.