CURRENTLY SOLD OUT

The Art of Insurgency : American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia by Donald W. Hamilton (1998, Hardcover)

In his analysis of insurgency war, Donald Hamilton first attempts to provide insight into a strategic concept he believes is little understood today, and to explain its complicated relationship to American policy failures in Southeast Asia during the post-1945 era of containment. The study develops a working model of insurgency, explaining it as both a unique method and type of war-making. Significant findings include the inability of policymakers to perceive a potential insurgency in Vietnam as early as 1946, subsequent American involvement in not one, but three Asian insurgencies during the 1950s, and the ultimate failure of the U.S. military to meet the insurgency challenge in South Vietnam. This inability to eliminate the insurgency led not only to the complete breakdown of the South Vietnamese government, but was the primary reason why further U.S. military action after 1965 would prove ineffectual. This historical narrative also follows the involvement of several key players, including the personalities of Edward Lansdale, Sir Robert Thompson, Archimedes Patti, and Vo Nguyen Giap, who through their life experiences and writings, provide a keen profundity into why insurgencies occur, why they fail, and why they succeed.

Author
Donald w. Hamilton
Publication Name
Art of Insurgency : American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia
Format
Hardcover
Language
English
Publication Year
1998
Type
Textbook
Number of Pages
216 Pages

Number of Volumes
1 Vol.
Lc Classification Number
U241
Reviews
"A well-researched look into why insurgencies occur, why they sometimes fail, and why more often seem to succeed." Sea Power, "A well-researched look into why insurgencies occur, why they sometimes fail, and why more often seem to succeed."- Sea Power
Table of Content
Foreword Preface Illustrations Maps List of Abbreviations Figures Insurgency and American Military Doctrine: An Introduction Explaining Insurgency An Analysis of Two Postwar Asian Insurgencies The First Vietnamese Insurgency, 1945-1954 Seeds of American Commitment The Second Vietnamese Insurgency: Phase I The Second Vietnamese Insurgency: Phase II Secondary Insurgency and the American Reaction Summary Notes on Lessons of a Failed Strategy Selected Bibliography Index
Target Audience
College Audience
Topic
Asia / Southeast Asia, Public Policy / Military Policy, Military / Strategy, Military / General, Revolutionary
Lccn
96-044178
Dewey Decimal
355.02/18
Dewey Edition
20
Illustrated
Yes
Genre
History, Political Science

Best Selling in Adult Learning & University

Current slide {CURRENT_SLIDE} of {TOTAL_SLIDES}- Best Selling in Adult Learning & University

Current slide {CURRENT_SLIDE} of {TOTAL_SLIDES}- Save on Adult Learning & University