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What did these planning tools allow officials to see, and what did they hide from view?. And, as we assess the failures in our response to the pandemic and attempt to prepare for "the next one," to what extent should we take for granted the capacity of these tools to guide future interventions effectively?.
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About this product
Product Identifiers
PublisherPolity Press
ISBN-10150955727X
ISBN-139781509557271
eBay Product ID (ePID)25064602725
Product Key Features
Number of Pages150 Pages
Publication NamePlanning for the Wrong Pandemic : Covid-19 and the Limits of Expert Knowledge
LanguageEnglish
Publication Year2024
SubjectPublic Health, Sociology / General
TypeTextbook
Subject AreaSocial Science, Medical
AuthorAndrew Lakoff
FormatHardcover
Dimensions
Item Height0.7 in
Item Weight11.2 Oz
Item Length8.6 in
Item Width5.7 in
Additional Product Features
Intended AudienceScholarly & Professional
LCCN2023-932670
Dewey Edition23
Dewey Decimal362.196241440973
Table Of ContentIntroduction Chapter 1: Preparedness Indicators Chapter 2: Essential Workers Chapter 3: The Strategic National Stockpile Chapter 4: The Scenario-Based Exercise Chapter 5: Emergency Use Chapter 6: Gain-of-Function Epilogue
SynopsisThe fractious and disorganized governmental response to the coronavirus pandemic in the United States prompted many observers to ask why the country which had the knowledge, resources, and plans to deal with such an event was caught so unprepared when the crisis struck. In fact, as Andrew Lakoff shows, US officials had been planning for a pandemic for more than two decades, and many of these plans were implemented in the early stages of the pandemic. As authorities responded to the crisis, they relied on an already formulated set of concepts and tools that had been devised for managing a future emergency. These preexisting tools enabled officials to make sense of the event and to rapidly implement policies in response, but they also led to significant blind spots. What did these planning tools allow officials to see, and what did they hide from view? And, as we assess the failures in our response to the pandemic and attempt to prepare for "the next one," to what extent should we take for granted the capacity of these tools to guide future interventions effectively?