Discretion in Managerial Bonus Pools synthesizes and integrates a growing literature that has emerged over the past 10-15 years on the use of both objective and subjective performance indicators in managerial incentive plans. The authors examine the structure of efficient bonus pools (fixed payment schemes) in the presence of subjective performance indicators. The analysis covers a range of scenarios including single- and multi-agent settings, the interplay of objective and subjective indicators and short-term as opposed to long-term contracting relations. To synthesize the existing research, the authors frame their exposition around five recurring themes which collectively speak to the structure and the efficiency of incentive schemes based on subjective information i. Value of Subjective Performance Indicators. ii. Incremental Agency Cost. iii. Compression of Optimal Incentive Contracts. iv. Optimality of Proper Bonus Pools. v. Value of Multiperiod Contracting.
Product Identifiers
Publisher
Now Publishers Inc
ISBN-13
9781601984548
eBay Product ID (ePID)
108630446
Product Key Features
Author
Stefan Reichelstein, Merle Ederhof, Madhav V. Rajan
Publication Name
Discretion in Managerial Bonus Pools
Format
Paperback
Language
English
Subject
Accounting
Publication Year
2011
Type
Textbook
Number of Pages
88 Pages
Dimensions
Item Height
234mm
Item Width
156mm
Item Weight
137g
Additional Product Features
Title_Author
Merle Ederhof, Stefan Reichelstein, Madhav V. Rajan