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Retired USN
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Reviews (2)
24 April 2021
Definitive work
Definitive analysis of inter-war and events leading up to 07 Dec. Not only should this be read by any US military operator or staff officer, lessens learned about in-fighting, bureaucratic malaise, poor judgment, poor communication and most of all complacency are as appropriate today as it was then.
25 May 2021
Must Read
For anyone who is a serious student of 20th Century history this book is a must. For any executive in either private or public sector, especially the military this book is a must. RADM Layton not only gives great detail of both the code-breaking process, he defines explicitly how code breaking fits into the intelligence cycle of requirements-collection-processing-analysis-dissemination. Most importantly he describes in detail the failure of the above. Most readers are familiar with the Pearl Harbor debacle, over the period of 6 months before and hours before the attack. His analysis illustrates how the road to this tragedy actually begins in the 20's and 30's. Like most catastrophes the end result usually is not the result of one or two immediate issues. They are a result of a long journey with a series of mistakes made, to which ignorance, misinterpretation and complacency contribute. Starting with a heavy top-down central bureaucracy, run by incompetents (with regard to intelligence) the tragic chain of events was brought on by cross-functional cooperative failure, exacerbated by a silo mentality that kept agencies from collaborating with one another and discovering and determining a true threat picture. His evidence also exonerates to a great degree the actions of ADM Kimmel and LTG Short who were definitely scape-goated for failures of the Washington Bureaucratic swamp. Some examples: the repeated incorrect assumptions made by war plans, the usurpation of intelligence functions by R K Turner, the failure to integrate multi-sources of raw data with regard to Japan’s militarization of the Marshalls. The CYA testimony of senior Flag and General officers during the board of inquiry all point to a failure of leadership, a lack of character and integrity at the highest levels and the leveling of blame on those who were victims of the formers’ failure. The lessons learned for today's military and business organizations alike should be the recognition of mission failure when personal aggrandizement trumps mission focus, when organizational policy is made using simple "analytics" (lacking true analysis), a failure of executive leadership to clearly define organizational responsibility and failure to foster a culture of cooperation, honesty and integrity. Having spent many years in Naval Intelligence myself, coupled with similar experiences in small and large private enterprises, I have seen these mistakes repeated all too often with resultant failure. As far as this particular transaction, I purchased this work used as it is out of print and the few new copies are only available at an exorbitant price. Although I paid 3x the original price, the investment was more than worth it.